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Abstract. Empirical science, such as psychology and neuroscience, employ diverse 
methods to develop data driven models and explanations for complex phenomena. 
In research on the self, differences in these methods produce different depictions of 
persons. Research in developmental psychology highlights the role of intuitive be-
liefs, such as psychological essentialism and intuitive dualism, in individuals’ singu-
lar, cohesive, and stable sense of self. On the other hand, research in neuroscience 
highlights the de-centralized, distributed, multitudes of neural networks in compe-
tition making selves, with arguments around whether the interpretation of these 
data imply that the self is somehow fundamental and special to human functioning. 
In this paper, I explore these discrepant pictures of the self to advance understan-
ding about personhood. Specifically, I suggest that these divergent pictures of self 
from psychology and neuroscience have the potential to inform philosophical and 
theological discussions around personhood by anchoring models of persons in em-
pirical data. Likewise, I explore the opportunity for philosophy and theology to in-
form and enhance scientific research on the self by critiquing scientific bias and con-
struct development as well as highlighting potential limits in understanding selves 
with empirical models. 
Keywords: Self; identity; psychological essentialism; intuitive dualism; neuroscien-
ce; philosophy.
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Introduction
In a recent conversation between children, an 8-year-old laughed when 
a 5-year-old said she did not know what the word “personality” meant. 
The laughter stopped when the elder child was asked to define it for the 
younger. It seems the older child had an intuitive sense of personality 
but lacked the ability to define it. Psychologists, neuroscientists, philoso-
phers, and theologians take turns being the older and the younger sibling 
in equivalent engagements around the topic of personhood. Some dif-
ficulties presented in examinations of personhood stem from complex-
ities inherent to examining the thing we are; empirical investigations 
of personhood are influenced in important ways by the starting point 
of the observation. In this paper, I highlight how different representa-
tions of persons emerge from different methods of investigation. First, 
I detail psychological research describing intuitive beliefs about selves 
as singular, stable, and coherent, beliefs rooted in typical developmen-
tal constraints. Following, I present neuroscientific views of selves as de-
centralized, competing multitudes. I  conclude by considering how dis-
crepancies between these perspectives present possibilities for advancing 
ideas about personhood, inviting engagement between empirical scienc-
es (i.e., psychology and neuroscience) and the humanities (i.e., philoso-
phy and theology). I argue that multiple disciplines, methods, and per-
spectives can enrich and extend understanding about personhood. 
1. Psychological Perspectives 
Psychologists do not often talk about personhood; rather, the focus is on 
a complex, interrelated network of ideas around identity and self. Talaifar 
and Swann (2018) characterize “the self as a multifaceted, dynamic, and 
temporally continuous set of mental representations” (p. 2), an inter-
changeable term with identity. In this sense, self is the thing that we, as 
selves, use to answer the fundamental question about what it means “to 
be me,” to be a person. Developmental psychology has documented that 
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a sense of stable identity is present early in childhood and persists–even 
if implicitly–throughout the lifespan (Gelman 2003). This intuition, driv-
en by psychological essentialism and intuitive dualism, is central to shap-
ing beliefs about the nature of personhood. 
1.1. Psychological Essentialism
Psychological essentialism refers to the tendency of individuals to at-
tribute internal, non-obvious, unchanging attributes as the underlying 
cause of an entity’s true nature or identity (Gelman 2003). Essences need 
not be conceptually coherent or clearly articulated; children as young as 
3-years-old display psychological essentialism, reasoning that the inside 
of a living thing is what determines the outside of the thing (Gelman and 
Wellman 1991). By the age of 4, children consistently reason that identity 
conferring internal essences are unchanged by physical changes. A horse 
is a horse because its internal, unchanging “horse essence”; starting in 
early childhood it is understood intuitively that painting it to look like 
a zebra does not change its essence or its identity (Keil 1992). 
Psychological essentialism emerges early across diverse cultures, pos-
sibly due to a more fundamental bias in human cognition (Cimpian and 
Salomon 2014). However, the use of psychological essentialism as an 
identity-conferring system is not immune to experience. For instance, 
Newman and Keil (2008) find that as children age, explanations for es-
sences shifts from a view that essences are in a single place (i.e., the brain) 
to a view that they are distributed within an entity. This developmen-
tal shift moves children closer to adults’ essentialist-like reasoning about 
DNA. Moreover, individuals’ tendencies to essentialize category members 
also differs according to features of cultural input and language (Heyman 
and Giles 2006), suggesting that human cognitive defaults are not deter-
ministic. 
Importantly, psychological essentialism is not restricted to categories 
(e.g., horses, humans), but extends to individual identities. In a series of 
studies, Johnson (1990) gave 5- to 11-year-old children scenarios in which 
the child’s own brain replaced a  pig’s brain, or the child’s own brain, 
mouth, heart, or face replaced/was replaced by the brain, mouth, heart, 
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or face of a baby, similarly aged child, or older child. These experimental 
manipulations allowed Johnson to examine children’s beliefs about the 
role of different internal (possibly essential) and external body parts in 
conferring identity. Across the studies, most children identified the brain 
as more fundamental than other body parts in conferring identity. When 
asked “who are you?”, children answered that they were whatever entity 
housed their brain. This suggests that children have some understand-
ing of the role of the brain in identity (compared to the heart, mouth, 
and face). Notably, however, this research did not assess children’s con-
ceptions of minds in identity. Although understanding the connectedness 
between brain and mind is increasingly common (Riekki, Linderman, and 
Lipsanen 2013), it is still exceptional given evidence indicating that the 
human default position is one of separation of the physical body/brain 
and mind (e.g., Bloom, 2004). Other research probing children’s identity 
intuitions indicated that it is more believable to duplicate physical bod-
ies without minds and that the duplication of physical parts does not also 
bring properties of the mind (e.g., memories; Hood et al. 2012), properties 
associated with identity. 
The ease and frequency of explanations consistent with psychological 
essentialism has implications that extend beyond the direct question of 
how we understand identity and personhood. For example, one derivative 
of psychological essentialism important in a psychological view of per-
sonhood is intuitive dualism (Forstmann and Burgmer 2015). 
1.2. Intuitive Dualism 
Intuitive dualism refers to an untaught belief that minds and bodies are 
distinct and separable (Bloom, 2004). Explorations of intuitive dualism 
often focus on its connection to persistent and widespread beliefs about 
an afterlife (e.g., Riekki, et al. 2013, but see also Hodge 2008). For the pre-
sent argument, it is important to articulate the content of the part-of-self 
(or, essence) that is believed to continue after death. 
There is a rich body of research in psychology documenting the de-
velopmental trajectories of beliefs about minds. Since the first use of the 
term theory of mind (Premack and Woodruff 1978), research on children’s 
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developing understanding that other people have minds–thoughts, be-
liefs, motivations–that are different from their own and that may be false 
has pervaded numerous domains of psychological research (Beaudoin, 
Leblanc, Gagner, and Beauchamp 2019). In many religious and cultur-
al contexts, these beliefs may be further refined and differentiated with 
concepts of the soul, spirit, or vitality/life force (Bering 2006; Richert and 
Harris 2008; Roazzi, Nyhof, and Johnson 2013). 
The way individuals conceptualize physical and mental life has im-
portant implications. For example, Forstmann, Burgmer, and Mussweil-
er (2012) demonstrate that dualistic (versus materialistic) views of hu-
man persons influence health behaviors. Even among mental health care 
professionals, differing views about disorders as being in the body (e.g., 
schizophrenia) versus being in the mind (e.g., adjustment disorders) led 
to different conclusions about the effectiveness of biological/medical in-
terventions compared to psychotherapeutic interventions (Ahn, Proctor, 
and Flanagan 2009). Moreover, it seems that even if individuals adopt ex-
plicitly monistic views of personhood, dualistic cognitive intuitions can 
still emerge in thinking and behavior (Forstmann and Burgmer 2015), 
suggesting that these intuitions persist across the lifespan. Research sug-
gests that when individuals reason about separate bodies and minds (and/
or souls), essential elements of identity are wrapped up with the immate-
rial constructs, a finding that holds even across cultures that differ in im-
portant ways in their explicit and cultural treatment of these ideas (e.g., 
Cohen, Burdett, Knight, and Barrett 2011; Chudek et al. 2018). 
1.3. Intuition and Experience
Although intuitions around the essential nature of identity and the divi-
sion of physical and mental life emerge early in development, they are not 
immune to experience and learning. As Marcus Gary (2004) explains, in-
nateness “doesn’t mean unmalleable; it means organized in advance of ex-
perience” (p. 40). Take, for example, theories of emotions demonstrating 
that children can experience, express, and identify some “basic emotions” 
cross-culturally, without learning (Izard 1992). But these emotions are few 
relative to the expanse of complex emotions that emerge to involve a ref-
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erence to one’s self. Self-conscious emotions (i.e., pride, shame, guilt) are 
a particular type of complex emotion that demonstrate how experience 
informs children’s learning and expression of emotions within their soci-
ocultural environment. Lagattuta and Thompson (2007) review research 
on these emotions, noting that their emergence requires specific develop-
mental achievements–awareness of self, self-evaluation, social compari-
son, and even early markers of a theory of mind–but that the roots of these 
achievements accumulate over time. For example, after 18 months, most 
children will recognize that a red dot on the forehead of a mirrored reflec-
tion is on their forehead and will reach to their own head, not to the reflec-
tion (Lewis and Brooks-Gunn 1979), an achievement possible because of 
many previous experiences of contingent interaction with the world driv-
en what the child is coming to recognize as self. An entirely new repertoire 
of emotions emerges once children have sufficiently consolidated an in-
tuitive sense of self, especially self as distinct from the external world and 
self as capable of producing effects. Experience shapes the expression of 
emotions–and the self that is experiencing them.
Research in developmental psychology on intuitive beliefs represent 
only a small part of psychological research relevant to discussions of self, 
identity, and personhood. Another potentially fruitful avenue for ad-
vancing conceptions of personhood comes from psychological research 
on mindfulness. Mindfulness-based interventions teach individuals to 
evaluate their intuitive sense of self (e.g., the verbal/storied self) against 
their observing self; to identify thoughts without fusing to them (un-
questioningly accepting them as truth, Harris, 2008, p. 33-40). By dis-
tinguishing helpful narratives from automatic thoughts, individuals en-
hance their psychological flexibility rooted in an expanded sense of self.
2. Neuroscientific Perspectives of Persons 
In contrast to intuitions of a cohesive and coherent singular self, neu-
roscience research reveals a different conceptualization of personhood: 
a story of multitudes. Patricia Churchland (2002) argues that neurosci-
ence disabuses the notion “of the self as a singular entity and encourag-
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es the idea that self-representing involves a plurality of functions, each 
having a range of shades, levels, and degrees” (p. 309). To understand the 
potential contribution of neuroscience to discussions on personhood, it 
is important first to understand the basic principles of localized function 
and distributed processing. 
Localized function refers to specialization of specific brain regions in 
supporting specific functions (Weis et al. 2019). For example, when the 
New York Times reports that “The more a participant reported feeling 
passionately in love, the more [the angular gyrus] shifted into overdrive” 
(Heyman 2017, para. 13), this conveys a  research finding for increased 
activation in the neurons in the angular gyrus, on average, among par-
ticipants who were in love compared to those less in love and compared 
to baseline levels of activation in this region. The interpretation, then, is 
that the brain’s processing of romantic love is localized in this brain re-
gion. Posner and colleagues (1988) explained localized function by say-
ing that any task, such as the experience of romantic love, “is not per-
formed by any single area of the brain, but the operations that underlie 
the performance are strictly localized” (p. 1627). This explanation high-
lights how localized function cannot be understood independently of the 
principle of distributed processing (Fox and Friston 2012).
Distributed processing of localized functions suggests that any hu-
man behavior is not in “spot A,” but rather divided into smaller compo-
nents, each processed across a vast array of interconnected neural net-
works (Ei senreich, Akaishi, and Hayden 2017). For example, although it 
is widely accepted that the fusiform face area (FFA) of the brain under-
girds facial recognition processing, stressing the activity of the FFA for 
face processing fails to acknowledge the extent of the integration of brain 
processing (Fox and Friston 2012) and that “face processing” is a  task 
composed of numerous sub-parts processed in a distributed manner (Sui, 
Chechlacz, and Humphreys 2012). 
Toga and colleagues (2012) suggest that understanding the connec-
tions between localized areas of function is better than the more stag-
nant modular approach to brain functions. They point to the promise 
of the Human Connectome Project in highlighting the interconnectiv-
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ity and function of specific neural networks that ultimately regulate and 
produce human activity. The implications of a neural system that is so 
densely connected–with even more connections within the system (feed-
back loops) than in connecting the system with the exterior world (feed-
forward; Bell 1999)–are vast. This is especially true considering the lack 
of central organizer to make sense of potential conflicts that arise be-
tween competing neural networks (Eisenreich et al. 2017).
In this way, modern neuroscience highlights an observation made 
by Jakob von Uexküll (1934/1992): perception of reality is surely limit-
ed by perspective. The umwelt is but a small slice of the reality of the 
umgebung. David Eagleman (2011) describes the umgebung of the brain 
as multitudes and teams of rivals, competing to rise to consciousness–
the umwelt. That human brains have constant and inaccessible compe-
tition between neural networks can help explain, for example, contra-
dictions between explicit and implicit beliefs and biases. It is possible to 
hold an explicit belief that conflicts with implicit beliefs about that same 
topic, when collected under specific experimental conditions. Consider 
Forstmann and Burgmer’s (2015) research on intuitive dualism: partici-
pants in their second study demonstrated different patterns of reasoning 
about body/mind divides when asked explicitly compared to when their 
reasoning was measured while experiencing cognitive load. In the latter 
context, it seems likely that different neural networks–normally restrict-
ed from consciousness by competing networks–could “slip through” to 
consciousness because of the experience of cognitive stress, a possibil-
ity consistent with other neurobiological explanations of bias (Korteling, 
Brouwer, and Toet 2018). 
This understanding of brain networking, competition, and activa-
tion serves as a context to a  fundamental question about personhood: 
how the brain represents the self. Though the literature on the neurosci-
ence of the self is vast, exploring neural substrates that underlie activi-
ties such as self-reference, self-concept, self-regulation (e.g., Heatherton 
2011; Northoff et al. 2006), one emergent question throughout this lit-
erature concerns the extent to which the self is special. Take, for exam-
ple, the finding that memory is improved when it involves self-reference 
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(Symons and Johnson 1997). The neuroscientific question of specialness 
concerns whether this benefit is because the brain processes self-referent 
information differently than other kinds of information. Some of the im-
port of this question belies a potential consequence of the lack of special-
ness; if the self is not special–if it operates like any other construct–then 
any notion that it is more than an illusory artifact of social processes may 
be suspect. 
Current work on this question is, at this point, insufficient to settle 
this question though several researchers have suggested that the self is 
special (Northoff 2016; Sui 2016). Northoff (2016) proposes a model of self 
that deviates from the commonplace notion that the self is best under-
stood as a higher-order function of the brain. Instead, he suggests that 
“we need to reverse our model of self; instead of the self being a higher-
order cognitive function of either brain or mind, the self may be the most 
fundamental function of the brain and its intrinsic or spontaneous activ-
ity” (p. 204). He ultimately argues that the brain’s default network can 
be understood as overlapping and containing the self, in terms of neural 
substrates. In other words, the network that is active when there is noth-
ing “happening”–when the brain is at rest–is the network that underlies 
much of the brain’s self-referential processing. Disturbances in this net-
work can cause fundamental disturbances in our sense of self, for exam-
ple, in the experience of psychosis (Buckner 2013).
Sui (2016) suggests that the self is the “golden thread” in binding, the 
perceptual process that integrates visual features into a  coherent rep-
resentation of external reality. Moreover, the self seems to play a criti-
cal role in the coupling of neural networks (Sui and Humphreys 2015). In 
contrast to functionalist views of self (e.g., Dennett 2003), Sui and Hum-
phreys argue that because the self is responsible for changing ongoing 
processes (e.g., in memory, perception), this is consistent with the inter-
pretation of self as mechanism, not as fictional construct. Although per-
suasive and consistent with the data, Lane, Duncan, Cheng and Northoff 
(2016) suggest that arguing that the self is special and somehow funda-
mental does not also require abandoning the conception of the self as 
a social construction, emerging out of narrative explanations. 
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This discussion about the neuroscience of selves does not address the-
ories of extended cognition, which suggests that a  robust understand-
ing of the neuroscience of self requires not just drilling down to the mul-
titudes within but also reaching out into the external world of artifacts 
and relationships inextricably linked to selves (Strawn and Brown 2020). 
It seems that understanding self as multitudes within and as extended 
without might open new ways of engaging personhood, with special rel-
evance to Christian doctrines of imago Dei and the Trinity.
3. Preliminary Conclusions
Psychological research into personhood thus illuminates a central ten-
sion of studying people: there are multiple levels of explanation and they 
do not necessarily correspond to one another as neatly as one might hope. 
The methods of psychological science can document what people believe 
about themselves, how these self-views are influenced by normative de-
velopmental processes, and how these views influence important aspects 
of human functioning across the lifespan. Humans harbor deep-seated 
intuitions about selves as singular, cohesive, and enduring. Yet, neuro-
science research suggests these self-views are myopic. A multitude, rival-
ry-based network view of personhood–special or not–that is generated 
by neuroscience is at odds with human intuition. I believe these tensions 
around intuitive beliefs and neuroscientific explanations about self offer 
several important starting points for fruitful engagement between em-
pirical sciences, especially psychology and neuroscience, and the human-
ities, especially philosophy and theology, in understanding personhood. 
4. Implications
Here I propose three potential contributions to understanding person-
hood in bridging between science–psychology and neuroscience–and 
the humanities–philosophy and theology. Specifically, I propose that re-
search in psychology and neuroscience can serve as an anchor for philo-
sophical and theological examinations of the human person, grounding 
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those discussions according to evidence about how personhood functions 
in the lives of people. Additionally, I propose two general ways that psy-
chological thinking about selves can be improved by philosophy/theol-
ogy: correcting bias and articulating the appropriate boundaries of sci-
entific investigations. 
4.1. Empirical Science Informing Philosophy and Theology
The preceding discussion highlights a  small selection of research on 
ideas related to self and identity. This research presents a picture that, 
when zoomed out far enough, is clear: human brains run on de-central-
ized neural competition and redundancies. These same brains produce 
a cohesive, continuous, and sturdy sense of self, a self experienced as the 
“me” that I control. This emergent sense of self develops through experi-
ence and relationships (Balswick, King, and Reimer 2016). This suggests 
an inextricable interconnectedness of the multitudes to the psychological 
perceptions, and it also highlights how integrating distinct ways of un-
derstanding persons is necessary for a phenomenologically thick repre-
sentation of persons (Franck 2021). 
In the same way that Godfrey-Smith (2003) suggests that “Testing in 
science is typically an attempt to choose between rival hypotheses about 
the hidden structure of the world” (p. 211), I propose that psychological 
science about how selves work can provide a useful benchmark for philo-
sophical and theological propositions about selves. The tools available to 
philosophers and theologians are different than that of a scientist, allow-
ing for theories and arguments that extend beyond empirical data. Yet, 
when data serve as an anchor to philosophical and theological reasoning, 
it can provide important feedback on the viability and trustworthiness of 
specific models, given what the world–and the persons who fill it–are actu-
ally like. Scholarly and applied work around concepts of persons, includ-
ing discussions around a special or a socially constructed self, as well as 
implications for doctrines of creation (especially the imago Dei) and the 
doctrine of the Trinity seem especially prepared for this kind of anchor-
ing. One such example of this anchoring comes from Scott Harrower’s 
(2019) work articulating a serious engagement with Trinitarian concepts 
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in the context of a scientifically grounded understanding of the effects of 
trauma and paths toward restoration. In this work, the doctrine of the 
Trinity is expounded because of its connection to empirical science on 
lived experience of trauma survivors.
Besides the potential contribution of psychology to the humanities, 
psychology is also poised to benefit from philosophical and theologi-
cal thinking around topics of personhood. Although these contributions 
need not be explicitly limited to research on personhood, this is an area 
that is particularly qualified to benefit from scrutiny and feedback from 
non-empirical scholars thinking through these issues.
4.2. The Humanities Informing Psychology and Neuroscience
Science is designed to operate as a democratic, self-correcting body of 
knowledge, yet it is a body of knowledge created by individuals with bias. 
Ideally, in the long-run, individual bias is overcome by scientific argu-
ments in a public forum between differently biased individuals. When 
science works, the ideas and explanations that are the most consistent 
with the evidence and with features of good scientific explanations win 
out over other ideas (Okasha, 2016). However, bias is psychologically ro-
bust (Smith 2020), a  fact evident in the social science “replication cri-
sis.” Rather than discrediting science, the replication crisis is ultimately 
good news for scientific progress; it has forced the scientific community 
to wrestle with diverse types of bias for improved understanding and ex-
planations (Schimmack 2020). 
This examination of science by scientists is important because the 
best explanation for any set of data is not necessarily self-evident. Yet, as 
Godfrey-Smith (2003) suggests in discussing eliminative inference, “Sci-
entists often think they have ruled out (or rendered very unlikely) all the 
feasible alternatives to their preferred theory–but in hindsight we can 
see that in many cases they did not do so, because we now believe a theory 
they did not even consider” (p. 213). Thus, a first potential contribution to 
empirical science may come from philosophers and theologians pressing 
scientists to identify their biases and the assumptions these produce, es-
pecially as related to how assumptions influence research questions, pro-
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cesses, and interpretations (Williams 2005). Such an examination may be 
essential in clarifying the construct itself. Core to the research process is 
the operational definition of the construct, yet research relevant to dis-
cussions of personhood use a wide variety of terms such as self, identi-
ty, self-concept, and self-representations. These constructs are inconsist-
ently defined and often lack clarity on how they work together and how 
they are different (Talaifar and Swann 2018). This difficulty is magnified 
when neuroscientific explanations of self are included, as this also intro-
duces questions at the center of identity theory (are the neural circuits of 
self the same thing as self; Myin and Zahnoun, 2018) and consciousness 
(Blackmore 2005). 
A second potential contribution of philosophy and theology to science 
in the advancement of understanding personhood is in serving as com-
mentators on the proper and necessary boundaries of science (Rosenberg, 
2012, p. 1-3). In writing about neuroscience and artificial intelligence 
(AI), Anthony J. Bell (1999) wrote
Either we are machines, in which case AI should be possible and neuroscience 
should be able to work out the algorithm (or algorithms) that the brain is run-
ning, or we are something else, in which case both projects will fail in their 
ultimate goals, which is not to say they will not achieve great things along the 
way. (One of the great things that they might achieve is an exact picture of 
their own limits.) (p. 2014)
Such a view, I speculate, fails to account for a philosophically informed 
understanding of the assumptions that underlie science, generally, and 
neuroscience, specifically (e.g., Hedges and Burchfield, 2005; Slife, Yan-
char, and Reber, 2005, p. 4). On the contrary, philosophy can engage the 
questions that science cannot answer, including why these questions are 
currently (or permanently) out of science’s scope (Rosenberg 2012). More-
over, in questions of normative views (Rosenberg 2012, p. 5-6), theolo-
gy is especially well-suited to engage psychological science on questions 
of personhood. In writing about human development, Balswick, King, 
and Reimer (2016) articulate a fundamental problem in science engaging 
questions of flourishing and personhood: “developmental theory lacks 
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a guiding teleology” (p. 19). Thus, it seems possible that in enhancing and 
clarifying perspectives, assumptions, and constructs, philosophy can en-
hance the quality of progress in scientific examinations of personhood. 
In turn, these enhanced examinations can contribute to theological met-
anarratives about personhood that are outside scientific inquiry. 
Conclusion
In this paper, I outlined two different empirical ways to explore ques-
tions of personhood. Psychological research illuminates developmental 
constraints of psychological essentialism and intuitive dualism that un-
dergird the subjective experience of a unified self that “I” control. On 
the other hand, neuroscientific research suggests that the self may not 
be more than the emergence of some decentralized neural networks over 
others. In juxtaposing these bodies of research, I suggest empirical data 
points can inform philosophical and theological models of persons. Like-
wise, I highlight how philosophical and theological scrutiny of scientific 
research on selves can inform and enhance research. Ultimately, a clear 
and robust understanding of personhood will involve bringing together 
different ways of knowing, methods of investigating, and perspectives 
within and beyond empirical science. 
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